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Subspace Fuzzy Vault
Kyle Marshall, Davide Schipani, Anna-Lena Trautmann and Joachim Rosenthal
Abstract Fuzzy vault is a scheme providing secure authentication based on fuzzy
matching of sets. A major application is the use of biometric features for authenti-
cation, whereby unencrypted storage of these features is not an option because of
security concerns. While there is still ongoing research around the practical imple-
mentation of such schemes, we propose and analyze here an alternative construction
based on subspace codes. This offers some advantages in terms of security, as an
eventual discovery of the key does not provide an obvious access to the features.
Crucial for an efficient implementation are the computational complexity and the
choice of good code parameters. The parameters depend on the particular applica-
tion, e.g. the biometric feature to be stored and the rate one wants to allow for false
acceptance. The developed theory is closely linked to constructions of subspace
codes studied in the area of random network coding.
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1 Introduction
Fuzzy vault is the term used by Juels and Sudan in [7] to describe a cryptographic
primitive, in which a key κ is hidden by a set of features A in such a way, that any
witness B, which is close enough to A under the set difference metric, can decommit
κ . Fuzzy vault is related to the fuzzy commitment scheme of Juels and Wattenberg
[8], which gives a solution for noisy hashing of data for the Hamming distance. This
and a dual version of it, the fuzzy syndrome hashing scheme, were considered by
the authors in [1, 4, 17].
The motivation for fuzzy vault is related to the growing interest in using fuzzy
authentication systems, i.e. systems that do not require an exact match, but rather
a partial one, between two sets. Instances include the use of biometric features for
authentication, personal entropy systems to allow password recovery by answering a
set of questions with a level of accuracy above a certain threshold, privacy-protected
matching to allow find a match between two parties without disclosing the features
in public.
In early biometric authentication systems, comparison of a biometric was done
against an image stored locally on the machine, rather than in some hashed form. For
security purposes however, passwords are normally stored in hashed form. More-
over, since biometric data is irreplaceable in the sense that once compromised it
cannot be changed, storing the data in un-hashed form can pose a significant se-
curity risk [3]. Biometric data is inherently noisy, however, so direct hashing of a
user’s features would prevent the authentic user from accessing the system, as no er-
ror tolerance in the matching would be allowed. Using error correcting techniques,
the fuzzy vault is a scheme that can recover a secret key hidden by features even in
the presence of noise. Recent advancements have been made in the pre-alignment
of biometrics (cf. [11] and references therein), specifically fingerprints, allowing for
comparative methods without storage of the image itself. These advancements make
fuzzy vault a promising and feasible cryptographic solution for noisy data.
Recently, much work has been done in the area of error correcting codes in pro-
jective space. These codes turn out to be appropriate for error correction in random
network coding [9], and are referred to as error correcting random network codes,
projective space codes, or subspace codes. The aim of this paper is to show that
the construction of the fuzzy vault in [7] can be extended and adapted to work for
subspace codes in an analogous way with advantages and limitations. Namely, we
present a construction for a fuzzy vault based on constant dimension subspace codes,
a class of error correcting codes in projective n-space over a finite field Fq. For il-
lustration, an example will be provided by using spread codes, a particular class of
subspace codes.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides preliminaries,
terminology and refreshes the original fuzzy vault scheme. Section 3 presents the
new scheme based on subspace codes. Section 4 relates to security and examples and
lastly Sections 5 and 6 give further considerations and concluding final remarks.
2 Preliminaries
Denote by Fq the finite field with q elements, where q is a prime power. The set
difference metric d∆ is defined as
d∆ (A,B) := |(A\B)∪ (B\A)|, A,B ⊆ Fq
and the Hamming metric dH is defined as
dH(u,v) := |{i | ui 6= vi}|, u = (u1, . . . ,un),v = (v1, . . . ,vn) ∈ Fnq.
Let g1, . . . ,gn ∈ F∗q be distinct elements. A k-dimensional Reed-Solomon code C ⊆
F
n
q can be defined as
C = {( f (g1), . . . , f (gn)) | f (x) ∈ Fq[x],deg( f )< k}.
It has minimum Hamming distance dmin,H(C ) = n− k+ 1 and cardinality |C |= qk
[12].
A constant dimension (subspace) code is a subset of the Grassmannian Gq(k,n),
the set of all k-dimensional subspaces of Fnq. The subspace distance defines a metric
on Gq(k,n), given by
dS(U,V ) := dim(U +V)− dim(U ∩V ), U,V ∈ Gq(k,n)
for U,V ∈ Gq(k,n) [9]. While finding good subspace codes is still an open re-
search problem, there are many candidates now, including the Reed-Solomon-like
and spread code constructions [9, 13]. An explicit construction of a spread code can
be found in [13], and it is this construction we use as the definition of a spread code:
Let p(x) ∈ Fq[x] be an irreducible monic polynomial of degree k and P ∈ Fk×kq be
its companion matrix. Let n = ks for s ∈ N. Then,
S = {rowsp(A1 | · · · | As) | Ai ∈ Fq[P],(A1 | · · · | As) 6= (0 | · · · | 0)}
is called a (k,n)-spread code, where rowsp(A) is the row space of a matrix A. From
the definition, one can see that the minimum subspace distance of a spread code is
dmin,S(S ) = 2k and that the cardinality is |S |= q
n−1
qk−1 .
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For practical purposes we need a unique representation of subspaces, and we will
choose their matrix representation in reduced row echelon form (i.e. the matrix in
reduced row echelon form whose row space is the respective subspace) as such.
We will now briefly revisit the fuzzy vault scheme [7]. We will refer to the fol-
lowing description (cf. also [6]), although we are aware of different interpretations
of the scheme throughout the literature, especially in terms of the decoding algo-
rithms and parameters ([16]). Since this scheme is based on polynomial evaluation,
it will henceforth be called the polynomial fuzzy vault (PFV) scheme.
Let κ =(k0,k1, ...,kℓ−1)∈Fℓq be the secret key and κ(x)= k0+k1x+ ...kℓ−1xℓ−1 ∈
Fq[x] the corresponding key polynomial. Let A ⊂ Fq\{0} be the set of genuine
features with |A| = t > ℓ. Furthermore, let λ : Fq → Fq be a random map such
that λ (x) 6= κ(x) for all x ∈ B. Choose r > t and select a set B ⊂ Fq\A such that
|B|= r− t. Construct the sets
Pauth = {(x,κ(x)) | x ∈ A},
Pcha f f = {(x,λ (x)) | x ∈ B},
V = Pauth∪Pcha f f .
We will call Pauth the set of authentic points, Pcha f f the set of chaff points and V
the set of vault points.
The remaining parts of the fuzzy vault are a code and a corresponding error
correcting decoding algorithm. The code is the ℓ-dimensional Reed-Solomon code
C ⊆ Ftq,
C = {( f (g1), . . . , f (gt )) | f (x) ∈ Fq[x],deg( f )< ℓ},
whose defining distinct evaluation points g1, . . . ,gt are the points in A, i.e. the gen-
uine features. The key polynomial κ(x) gives rise to a codeword of C . If a witness
attempts to gain access to the key, the witness submits a set of features W ⊂ Fq. Let
Z ⊆ V be the set of vault points (x,y) with x ∈W . As the error correction capability
of C is ⌊(t− ℓ)/2⌋, the witness needs |Z∩Pauth| ≥ t−⌊(t− ℓ)/2⌋= ⌈(t + ℓ)/2⌉ to
recover κ(x) with the decoding algorithm.
To simplify the setting and have a more workable model, assume that |W | = t
and that B = Fq\A. Then |Z| = t and we can rewrite d∆ (A,W ) = 2t − 2|A∩W | =
2t− 2|Z∩Pauth|). Thus the witness gains access to the key if
d∆ (A,W )≤ 2t− (t + ℓ) ⇐⇒ d∆ (A,W )≤ dmin,H(C )− 1.
It was shown in [15] that certain reasonable parameters for the PFV scheme
cause the system to be susceptible to a brute force attack. Choi et al. in [2] speed up
the attack by using a fast polynomial reconstruction algorithm. These attacks may
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indicate that additional security measures should be taken to prevent the loss of a
user’s features. A different type of security analysis is provided in [6].
3 A Fuzzy Vault Scheme Utilizing Subspace Codes
We will now explain our new variant of the fuzzy vault scheme, and call this particu-
lar implementation the subspace fuzzy vault (SFV) scheme. Unlike the PFV scheme
in which the key is given by the coefficients of a polynomial, the key κˆ in this
scheme is a subspace with a disguised generator matrix κ (not in reduced row ech-
elon form).
Definition 1. Let k ≤ n, C ⊂ Gq(k,n) a constant dimension subspace code, and κˆ ∈
C a secret subspace. Choose some κ ∈ Fk×nq such that rowsp(κ) = κˆ . We will hide
the key by a set of linearly independent features A ⊂ Fkq with |A| = k and a set
B = Fkq\A. Let λ (x) : Fkq → Fnq be a random map such that λ (x) 6∈ rowsp(κ) for all
x ∈ B. Define the sets
Pauth = {(x,xκ) | x ∈ A},
Pcha f f = {(x,λ (x)) | x ∈ B},
V = Pauth∪Pcha f f .
Pauth is called the set of authentic points, Pcha f f is called the set of chaff points,
and V the set of vault points.
In order for a witness to decommit κˆ , a set W ⊂ Fkq is submitted and the second
coordinates of the elements in the vault whose first coordinates correspond to W are
used to generate a subspace W ′. This subspace is then decoded to yield a codeword
U ∈ C . We assume that W consists of at most k linearly independent features.
For a set S ⊂ Fkq, we will denote by 〈S〉κ the subspace spanned by the elements
{sκ | s ∈ S}. We will also assume dim(W ′) = |W |, although this may not happen,
introducing some probability of error, as we mention below. The assumption is jus-
tified by estimating its probability using counting formulas like that in the following
Lemma 1, whilst supposing n big enough and the second coordinates of the chaff
points being randomly chosen within their domain.
Theorem 1. In the setting of Definition 1, the vault recovers the key κˆ if and only if
d∆ (A,W )≤
1
2
(dmin,S(C )− 1).
Proof. We can express W ′ = (W ′∩ κˆ)⊕E for some subspace E ⊂ Fnq. As shown in
[9], we can uniquely recover κˆ from W ′ if and only if dS(W ′, κˆ)≤ 12(dmin,S(C )−1).
6 K. Marshall, D. Schipani, A.-L. Trautmann and J. Rosenthal
Using properties of the rank and linear algebra identities, we get
d∆ (A,W ) = |W \A|+ |A\W|
= dim(〈W \A〉κ)+ dim(〈A\W〉κ)
= dim(〈W \A〉κ)+ k− dim(〈A∩W 〉κ)
= dim(E)+ k− dim(κˆ ∩W ′)
= dS(W ′, κˆ).
Indeed, as |W | ≤ k, |A| = k, and W and A are sets of linearly independent features,
Sylvester’s rank inequality implies |W \A| ≤ dim(〈W \A〉κ), while the inequality in
the other direction is obvious, therefore |W \A|= dim(〈W \A〉κ); similarly we have
|A\W |= dim(〈A\W 〉κ) and |A∩W |= dim(〈A∩W 〉κ ). Also dim(κˆ∩W ′) = |A∩W |,
as the second coordinates of W \A generate a subspace which does not intersect κˆ
by definition of Pcha f f and given that B = Fkq\A.
Overall, it follows that d∆ (A,W ) = dS(W ′, κˆ), and therefore we can uniquely de-
code W ′ to κˆ as soon as the set difference between A and W is at most 12 (dmin,S(C )−
1). ⊓⊔
3.1 Variants of the scheme
In order to loosen the constraints on the choice of parameters, other settings and
scheme variants can be considered, although some probability of error may be in-
troduced.
For example, we can allow |A| = |W | = t ≥ k, with the features thought as ran-
domly chosen in the ambient space rather than linearly independent. Other looser
assumptions include also B being a proper subset of Fkq\A.
In these cases, one needs to compare dim(κˆ∩W ′) with |A∩W | and dim(κˆ +W ′)
with |A∪W |. For example dim(κˆ ∩W ′) is no bigger than k while |A∩W | would
be no bigger than t; |A∪W | counts elements of A which do not contribute to the
dimension of κˆ ; dim(W ′) may not be equal to |W | and the looser assumption on B
may reduce the dimension of W ′ even more, introducing further variability.
Depending on the assumptions and parameters, one can expect to have bounds of
the form:
d∆ (A,W )− δ1 ≤ dS(W ′, κˆ)≤ d∆ (A,W )+ δ2,
for some δ1,δ2 ∈ N. Depending on the given threshold for d∆ (A,W ), one can esti-
mate the probability of falsely accepting or falsely rejecting the witness.
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To be more precise, with the above mentioned looser assumptions, we get
dim(κˆ) = k = |A|−(t−k), dim(W ′)≤ |W | and dim(κˆ∩W ′)≤ |A∩W |. If y is an up-
per bound on the difference between |A∩W | and the maximum number of linearly
independent elements within A∩W (i.e. y = 0 for the hypothesis of Theorem 1), we
have on one side
dS(W ′, κˆ) = dim(κˆ)+ dim(W ′)− 2dim(κˆ ∩W ′)
≤ |A|− (t− k)+ |W |− 2(|A∩W |− y)
= d∆ (A,W )− (t− k)+ 2y.
On the other side, if z is an upper bound for |W |− dim(W ′), we get
dS(W ′, κˆ) = dim(κˆ)+ dim(W ′)− 2dim(κˆ ∩W ′)
≥ |A|− (t− k)+ |W |− z− 2(|A∩W|)
= d∆ (A,W )− (t− k)− z.
Note that z depends on the assumptions on the size of B and on the choice of chaff
points and the parameter n, as discussed in the first part of Section 3. I.e. z can be
neglected if n is big enough, B is the complement to A, and the chaff points are
randomly chosen. Similar bounds can also be obtained for t < k.
Incidentally, these inequalities provide an alternative proof to Theorem 1.
4 Security and Examples
Notice that we can use n as a degree of freedom to enlarge the size of the key space.
We know the following fact from [10]:
Lemma 1. Let k≤ δ ≤ n. The number of δ ×n matrices over Fq with rank k is given
by
Nq(k,δ ,n) =
(
∏k−1i=0 qn− qi
)(
∏k−1i=0 qδ − qi
)
∏k−1i=0 qk − qi
. (1)
With δ = κ we can see that we can play on n to make this number grow as we
please, in order to make it hard searching for the right set of k linearly independent
features.
Moreover, the complexity of such a brute force attack should be combined with
the difficulty of determining the rank of an arbitrary k×n matrix over Fq. The naive
approach, using Gauss algorithm, requires at most n(k2− k) field operations, and in
case the field is F2 at most n(k2− k)/2. There exist fast algorithms for determining
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the rank of a matrix but these are only asymptotically better and are often much
worse for small values of k and n.
4.1 Other attacks
When |A| = t > k, not only may some difficulty in decoding arise, but if t is much
bigger than k, other types of brute force attacks may be devised. In the following a
strategy is described which tries to find a set in Fnq containing k linearly independent
vectors that are meant to reveal the authentic features.
Assume now to have t authentic points and r− t chaff points, with the set of
features {x1, ...,xt} being a set of random elements of Fkq. We can assume that the
second coordinates of the authentic set {x1κ , ...,xtκ} contain a set of k linearly
independent vectors in Fnq. Indeed, given Lemma 1, we can compute the probability
that x1κ , ...,xtκ contains a set of k linearly independent vectors as
Nq(k,k, t)
qkt
,
that is the probability that (x1, ...,xt)T is a rank k matrix. For common vault pa-
rameters, and especially for larger t, this value is close to 1, so as to justify our
assumptions.
Now, the expected number of subsets of size δ out of r > δ random points in Fnq
that span a k-dimensional space can be estimated as
αq(k,δ ,n) =
(
r
δ
)
Nq(k,δ ,n)
qδn
. (2)
Ideally, an attacker would want to find a δ0 ≤ |A|= t so that αq(k,δ0,n)< 1 in order
to have a high probability of recovering the key in the event that the δ0 points span
a space of dimension k. On the other side, to counter this type of attack, one tries to
keep k very close to t and r big enough, so that αq does not get small.
We will approximate the complexity of a brute force attack following this ap-
proach. The attack is similar in approach to that proposed in [7] and depends on
finding a suitable δ0, so that the probability of δ0 random vectors in Fnq spanning a
subspace of dimension k is small.
It is noted in [15] that the average number of attempts for a user to guess δ
points in the authentic set is
(
r
δ
)
/
( t
δ
)
< 1.1(r/t)δ for r > t > 5. Given that it takes
n(δ 2−δ )/2 operations to row reduce a δ ×n binary matrix, we obtain the following
upper bound for the expected time to recover the key.
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Lemma 2. In the above settings, let δ0 be so that α2(k,δ0,n)< 1 from equation (2).
On average, an attacker can recover the secret key in C · (r/t)δ0 operations, where
C < 0.55 ·n(δ 20 − δ0).
4.2 Example using spread codes
As an example of how to construct a vault using subspace codes, we will use spread
codes, as defined in Section 2.
Spread codes are somewhat restrictive in that the minimum distance is com-
pletely determined by k, unlike other subspace codes where one can trade off the
distance with other parameters. Nevertheless we illustrate the construction using
spread codes because of their simplicity.
Example 1. Let us assume that the features belong to F162 , so that k = 16. In this
case, we can recover the key if and only if the set difference is at most 15. We are
free to choose n as long as it is a positive integer multiple of k. For example we can
choose n = 96 so that we have roughly 280 keys.
Note that an (n,k)q spread code can be decoded in O((n− k)k5) field operations
over Fq, as shown in [5]. For more information on spread codes and other decoding
algorithms, the reader is referred to [5, 13, 14].
5 Further Considerations
One of the disadvantages of using a biometric for security is that once an attacker
knows a user’s features, the user can never use a biometric scheme based on those
features again. In the PFV finding the key is essentially equivalent to finding the
features, as they are immediately retrievable as the first coordinates of the points
in the authentic set, i.e. by testing whether these correspond to evaluations of the
key polynomial. In the SFV, instead, an attacker who is capable of obtaining κˆ ,
has no big advantage in recovering x1, ...,xt from x1κ , ...,xtκ , not knowing which
particular κ was used to generate the second coordinates of the authentic points.
Ideally, to make the system even more resilient, the user should have the features
obscured, for instance one might want to store in the vault a hash of the features,
instead of the features themselves, as
Pauth = {(h(x),xκ) | x ∈ A}
Pcha f f = {(h(x),λ (x)) | x ∈ B},
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for a suitable hash function h. There is also another important reason to use hashes
as above in the system. In fact, suppose that an attacker finds an element in the un-
hashed version of the vault whose first coordinate is a linear combination of other
first coordinates of other elements in the vault. Then he can check whether its sec-
ond coordinate is also a linear combination (with the same coefficients) of the corre-
sponding second coordinates of the other elements. If this happens he can argue that
the element belongs to Pauth. Clearly also this attack can be prevented by taking t
close to k, besides using an hash function to hide the first coordinates.
6 Conclusions
We have proposed a new authentication scheme based on noisy data like biomet-
ric features. The idea has similarities with the fuzzy vault scheme and works in the
set difference metric, but it exploits the new setting of subspace codes. We have
presented a main theorem with two alternative proofs that shows under which dis-
tance conditions authentication succeeds with respect to the code parameters. We
have also showed the possibility of considering a few variants based on slightly dif-
ferent assumptions and how the main theorem can be generalized. This can allow
more flexibility for the choice of parameters and for future applications. The secu-
rity of the scheme has been analyzed, whereby brute force attacks require bigger
computational costs compared with traditional schemes. This however comes with
a price, that is the computational complexity of state of the art decoding schemes
for subspace codes is also rather high. There are also a few other nice features of the
new scheme, for example its resilience to exposing the features even if the key were
compromised.
Future research includes enhancing the scheme or devising alternative schemes
based on subspace codes that would enable more efficient and flexible parameter
profiles or decoding scenarios. Also considering examples with families of codes
other than spread codes may help suggest future steps towards an actual deployment
in practice.
7 Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Marco Bianchi and Natalia Silberstein for fruitful
discussions regarding this work.
Subspace Fuzzy Vault 11
References
1. M. Baldi, M. Bianchi, F. Chiaraluce, J. Rosenthal, and D. Schipani. On fuzzy syndrome
hashing with LDPC coding. In Proc. 4th Int. Symp. Applied Sciences in Biomedical and
Communication Technologies (ISABEL), pages 1–5. ACM, 2011.
2. W. Y. Choi, S. Lee, D. Moon, Y. Chung, and K. Y. Moon. A fast algorithm for polynomial
reconstruction of fuzzy fingerprint vault. IEICE Electronics Express, 5(18):725–731, 2008.
3. C. Clancy. Secure smartcard-based fingerprint authentication. In ACM Workshop on Biomet-
rics: Methods and Applications, pages 45–52, 2003.
4. F. Fontein, K. Marshall, J. Rosenthal, D. Schipani, and A.-L. Trautmann. On burst error
correction and storage security of noisy data. In Proc. 20th Int. Symp. Mathematical Theory
of Networks and Systems (MTNS), 2012.
5. E. Gorla, F. Manganiello, and J. Rosenthal. An algebraic approach for decoding spread codes.
Advances in Mathematics of Communications (AMC), 6(4):443 – 466, 2012.
6. J. Hartloff, M. Bileschi, S. Tulyakov, J. Dobler, A. Rudra, and V. Govindaraju. Security anal-
ysis for fingerprint fuzzy vaults. SPIE Defense, Security and Sensing, 2013, 2013.
7. A. Juels and M. Sudan. A fuzzy vault scheme. Des. Codes Cryptography, 38(2):237–257,
February 2006.
8. A. Juels and M. Wattenberg. A fuzzy commitment scheme. In Proc. 6th ACM conference on
Computer and communications security, CCS ’99, pages 28–36, 1999.
9. R. Koetter and F. Kschichang. Coding for errors and erasures in random network coding. In
Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Information Theory, 2007.
10. D. Laksov and A. Thorup. Counting matrices with coordinates in finite fields and of fixed
rank. Mathematica Scandinavica, 74:19–33, 1994.
11. P. Li, X. Yang, K. Cao, X. Tao, R. Wang, and J. Tian. An alignment-free fingerprint cryptosys-
tem based on fuzzy vault scheme. J. Netw. Comput. Appl., 33(3):207–220, May 2010.
12. F. J. MacWilliams and N. Sloane. The Theory of Error-Correcting Codes. North Holland,
Amsterdam, 1977.
13. F. Manganiello, E. Gorla, and J. Rosenthal. Spread codes and spread decoding in network
coding. In Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Information Theory, pages 881–885, 2008.
14. F. Manganiello and A.-L. Trautmann. Spread decoding in extension fields. Finite Fields and
Applications, 25:94–105, January 2014.
15. P. Mihailescu, A. Munk, and B. Tams. The fuzzy vault for fingerprints is vulnerable to brute
force attack. In Proc. BIOSIG, pages 43–54, 2009.
16. H. T. Poon and A. Miri. On efficient decoding for the fuzzy vault scheme. IEEE 11th Int.
Conf. Inf. Sci. Sig. Proc. Appl., pages 454–459, 2012.
17. D. Schipani and J. Rosenthal. Coding solutions for the secure biometric storage problem. In
Information Theory Workshop (ITW), 2010 IEEE, pages 1 –4, Dublin, Ireland, August 2010.
